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COMMENT 
How to Avoid Constitutional Challenges to 
State Based Climate Change Initiatives: A 
Case Study of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 
v. Corey and New York State Programs  
Lauren Baron* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the absence of coordinated national efforts, States have 
taken it upon themselves to reduce harmful carbon emissions and 
combat climate change using various programs and methods.1  
The President has made recommendations regarding national 
action to reduce emissions, however, there has been no legislative 
or all-encompassing national standards set.  Through the 
President’s Climate Action Plan (hereinafter “President’s Plan”), 
the President requires the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to create rules pertaining to carbon emissions under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) § 111(d), which the agency has recently 
 
* Pace University School of Law J.D. & Environmental Law Certificate 
Candidate, 2015; B.A., Cum Laude, Ecosystem Science and Policy with 
departmental honors in Sociology from the University of Miami (FL), 2012. The 
author would like to thank her colleagues at the Pace Energy and Climate 
Center, who encouraged her interest in energy law. The author would also like 
to thank the Pace Environmental Law Review editors and associates for their 
work on this comment. 
 1. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (2013) (establishing Connecticut’s 
RPS program); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2012) (establishing 
Massachusetts’s RPS program); 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 242-1.1 
(2008) (establishing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New York State); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.469A  (2007) (establishing Oregon’s RPS program); Order 
Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, In the Matter of a Renewable 
Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2004), available at 
www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New York State’s RPS). 
1
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proposed.2  As states continue to take individual action, concerns 
have arisen regarding the possibility of constitutional violations.3  
In 2006, due to a lack of national action on climate change, 
California became a first mover by enacting the Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard (LCFS) in order to reduce emissions from the 
transportation sector and limit California’s exposure to the 
negative effects of climate change.4  It quickly became the target 
of legal challenges under the Commerce Clause. 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, representatives of the in-
state and out-of-state corn ethanol industry, and American Fuels, 
representatives of petrochemical refineries and manufacturers, 
brought constitutional challenges against the California Air 
Resources Board for enacting the LCFS.5  The parties alleged the 
LCFS violates the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution and is preempted by section 211(o) of 
the CAA, which is part of the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”), 
as well as the Energy Independence and Securities Act.6  Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (hereinafter “Rocky Mtn. v. 
Corey”) reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2013, and 
the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in July 2014.7  
Although certiorari was denied, the outcome of the case has had a 
major impact on how other states can argue the constitutional 
validity of state enacted emissions reduction programs, and is 
 
 2. Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan, 
June 2013, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [hereinafter President’s Climate Action 
Plan]; JANE A. LEGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CLIMATE 
ACTION PLAN (May 28, 2014); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 3. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 
1031 (9th Cir. 2007); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 
WL 1612331, at *13 (D. Minn. 2014); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 
730 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 4. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2013). 
 5. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1092 
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 
F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 740 F.3d 507 (2014), cert. 
denied, 134 U.S. 2875 (2014). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2012); Corey, 730 F.3d at 1077; Michael R. Barr et al., 
Recent Litigation, 6-85 CA ENVTL. L. & LAND USE PRAC. § 85.03(4) (2014). 
 7. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, cert. denied, 134 U.S. 2875. 
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already being referred to in cases outside the Ninth Circuit.8  
After remand, it is possible the case could come back up through 
the Ninth Circuit and appear before the Supreme Court. 
Considering the decision in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and the 
EPA’s actions in accordance with the President’s Plan, this 
comment will outline best practices states can use in creating 
climate initiatives based on the challenges California faced in 
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey.  Part II of this comment will analyze the 
reasoning in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey.  Although certiorari was denied 
in the case, Part II will analyze recent Supreme Court dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to determine which cases are 
relevant to consider when analyzing a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge to state based climate initiatives.  Part III will discuss 
the current Federal Climate Action Plan and relevant provisions 
of the CAA, focusing on 111(d), and what states should consider 
when implementing climate initiatives to avoid constitutional 
challenges.  Part IV will highlight New York State based climate 
initiatives as a case study.  Like California’s LCFS, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) and New York’s Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (hereinafter “NYS RPS”) faced scrutiny as to 
whether the regulations violate the dormant Commerce Clause.9  
Part IV will also discuss how RGGI and the NYS RPS 
demonstrate how States can act locally and regionally applying 
best practices to create legally defensible climate initiatives.10 
 
 8. Corey, 740 F.3d at 507, cert. denied, 134 U.S. 2875 (denial of motion for 
rehearing en banc and inference that the parties will most likely file for 
certiorari); see Heydinger, 2014 WL 1612331, at *20; Carolyn Whetzel, Ethanol 
Groups Seek Supreme Court Review of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.bna.com/ethanol-groups-seek-
n17179888987/ (discussing how a petition for certiorari was filed on March 20, 
2014). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see generally Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co., 125 U.S. 465, 479 (1888). 
 10. This comment will focus only on dormant Commerce Clause challenges, 
however the author recognizes there are other constitutional challenges that can 
be brought against a state climate initiative of which states should be aware. 
Some potential constitutional challenges include a federal preemption challenge 
under the Supremacy Clause or a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Theoretically, if a state complies with the dormant Commerce Clause, federal 
law would not apply, so preemption would no longer be an issue, and the action 
would be non-discriminatory avoiding an Equal Protection challenge. 
3
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II.    ORIGINS OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS 
UNION V. COREY 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey focuses on the 
constitutionality of California’s LCFS.  Part II.a. discusses the 
history and pertinent provisions of the LCFS that were 
challenged in the case.  Part II.b. gives an overview of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  Part II.c. provides an overview of 
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and describes the reasoning the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals used to determine the LCFS does not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  Part II.d. describes 
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence to consider when 
defending a state-based climate initiative from a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge. 
A. Overview of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 established 
ambitious climate change legislation for the state of California.11  
The act established a cap-and-trade system and included a 
requirement that the State’s greenhouse gas emissions level must 
reach the emissions level in 1990 by the year 2020.12  In order to 
meet the required emissions levels, the act granted the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) the power to enact appropriate 
legislation to reduce emissions.13 
Greenhouse gas emissions from transportation constitute 
more than forty percent of California’s emissions.14  In an effort 
to decrease the amount of emissions from this major source, 
California’s LCFS focuses on reducing the greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with the production and use of 
transportation fuels.15  For a fuel to be sold in the California 
 
 11. Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501-
38599 (West 2006). 
 12. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(5)(a) (2014). 
 13. Id. § 2.04(5)(b). 
 14. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079. 
 15. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.1(a) (2013). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
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market it must meet a specific carbon intensity level enforced by 
CARB.16 
California’s primary goal of enacting the LCFS is to promote 
alternative fuels with less carbon emissions and deter carbon 
intensive fuel sources such as crude oil from being utilized in the 
market.17  The LCFS standard applies to both gasoline and 
alternative fuels.18  The entire lifecycle of the fuel is taken into 
account, from the extraction or production of the feedstock 
through the use of the fuel in a vehicle, otherwise known as a 
pathways analysis.19  California’s lifecycle analysis is based on 
the federally established and peer reviewed GREET pathway 
analysis that the Environmental Protection Agency uses in the 
RFS.20  The calculation considers the feedstock used to produce 
the fuel, the source of electricity for production, the distance the 
fuel must travel to the California market, and the emissions from 
the use of the fuel.21  Similar to the National RFS, California set 
up a credit trading system where a fuel producer may produce a 
higher carbon intensity fuel, and offset the emissions by 
purchasing credits from fuel producers with a carbon budget 
deficit.22  A more carbon intensive fuel can enter the California 
market, but in order to make a profit the fuel producer should 
ensure the cost of purchasing carbon credits will be recovered 
through retail fuel sales.23 
In 2011, CARB established initial carbon intensity standards 
for crude oil.24  In creating the carbon intensity standards for 
crude oil, CARB considered the make-up of the fuel market in 
 
 16. Id. at §§ 95481(a)(16), 95486, 95490 (defining carbon intensity as “the 
amount of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel 
delivered, expressed in grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per megajoule”). 
 17. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079-80. 
 18. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.1(a). 
 19. Id. tit. 17, § 95486(a)(2) (describing how a pathway analysis of the 
production of any type of fuel includes evaluation of feed stocks used to produce 
the fuel, production technology, geographic region, mode of transportation, and 
the amount and type of thermal and electrical energy consumed during 
production). 
 20. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081-82. 
 21. Tit. 17, § 95486(a). 
 22. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(7) (2012), with tit. 17, § 95485(c). 
 23. See generally Corey, 730 F.3d at 1080. 
 24. Id. at 1084-85. 
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2006.25  It distinguished high carbon intensity crude oil (HCICO) 
from non-HCICO, and existing sources of crude from emerging 
sources of crude.26  The distinction between HCICOs and non-
HCICOs was made to reduce emissions and encourage 
investment into alternative fuel development instead of 
investment in better ways to extract crude.27  Shortly after 
establishing the standards for crude oil, CARB determined basing 
the current carbon intensity levels on the 2006 calculations was 
infeasible, and amended the LCFS so that all crude oil would be 
assigned the higher carbon intensity level from either the year of 
sale or the average for 2010,28 meaning “all crude oil is assessed 
the same carbon intensity value” regardless of where it is 
produced.29  The amendment was made because the regulation as 
written was burdensome on in-state oil refiners and benefited 
out-of-state crude oil due to the potential for “fuel shuffling,” 
which occurs when high carbon intensity fuels shift to other 
markets rather than stay in the California market, thus 
decreasing the demand for California produced crude and 
harming California based crude producers.30 
B. Explanation of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The dormant Commerce Clause is not explicitly stated in the 
Constitution, but courts have read it into the Commerce Clause.31  
Dormant Commerce Clause issues emerge when Congress “has 
not affirmatively acted to either authorize or forbid the 
challenged state activity.”32  In order to evaluate whether a state 
action violates the dormant Commerce Clause, courts consider if 
 
 25. Id. at 1085-86. 
 26. Id. at 1085. 
 27. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1085-86. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1085. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 125 
U.S. 465, 479 (1888) (holding that an Iowa law requiring certificate stating the 
person to whom the out-of-state liquor was being sold could actually sell the 
liquor before being permitted into the state violated the Commerce Clause 
because it discriminated against the citizens and products of other states). 
 32. 3 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.03(3)(b) (2014) (citing Lewis v. BT 
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
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the action: (1) has an extraterritorial effect; (2) is facially 
discriminatory or has a discriminatory intent and a 
discriminatory effect in practice; and (3) indirectly burdens 
interstate commerce.33  Heightened judicial scrutiny applies if a 
party is able to show the regulation has a discriminatory effect in 
practice because it has an extraterritorial effect.34  A regulation 
violates the concept of extraterritoriality if it controls commerce 
outside the boundaries of the enacting state.35 
A regulation facially discriminates when it clearly benefits 
in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic or directly 
gives a benefit to in-state economic interests, but denies that 
benefit to out-of-state economic interests.36  If the regulation 
facially discriminates, strict scrutiny applies, and the state action 
is presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state can show the 
regulation uses the least restrictive means to achieve an 
important non-protectionist interest.37  After considering whether 
a state action facially discriminates and has an extraterritorial 
effect, a court must consider whether the state enacted the 
regulation with a discriminatory intent or with the purpose of 
disadvantaging out-of-state businesses or benefitting in-state 
businesses.38 
Courts must also consider the discriminatory effect by 
examining whether there is a disparate impact on out-of-state 
businesses.39  The regulation or state action will have a disparate 
 
 33. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084 
(E.D. Cal. 2011); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce §§ 40, 103 (2014); see Corey, 730 
F.3d at 1087. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 
644, 669 (2003); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 34. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 40. 
 35. Id.; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 36. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1087 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994)) (Discrimination “simply means differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the 
former and burdens the latter.”). 
 37. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (1970); see Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l 
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994); see also C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 
511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
 38. See generally Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 306 (2013) (citing Bacchus 
Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984)). 
 39. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992). 
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impact when its effects result in negative repercussions for a 
disproportionate amount of out-of-state businesses over in-state 
businesses.40  Finally, after the analysis of whether a regulation 
facially discriminates, or has a discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory purpose, a court must analyze the regulation 
under the Pike balancing test.41  The Pike test directs the court to 
balance the burdens the regulation imposes on interstate 
commerce versus the benefits of the regulation.42 
One method a state can use to defend against a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge is the market participant 
exception.43  Courts have determined states should have the 
ability to freely participate in the marketplace as “guardian and 
trustee for its people.”44  The market participant exception may 
apply when a state seeks to regulate in a particular area where 
the State itself participates in that particular market.45  A state 
acts as a market participant when it directly participates in the 
market.46  Under such circumstances, a state is permitted to 
“engage in otherwise discriminatory practices . . . so long as the 
state is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market 
regulator.”47  However, the market participant exception is not a 
complete solution to a potential dormant Commerce Clause 
violation.  If a court reaches the Pike balancing test and reveals 
that the burdens placed on interstate commerce outweigh the 
 
 40. Lee & Duane, supra note 38, at 303. 
 41. Barr et al., supra note 6, § 85.03(4); see generally Pike, 397 U.S. 137. 
 42. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 
1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 43. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (“Nothing in 
the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence 
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the 
right to favor its own citizens over others.”). 
 44. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1980) (“There is no indication 
of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate 
freely in the free market.”); see also Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810. 
 45. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 362 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 46. White v. Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983) 
(“[I]n this kind of case there is ‘a single inquiry: whether the challenged 
‘program constituted direct state participation in the market.’”) (quoting Reeves, 
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435 (1980)). 
 47. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 362 (quoting S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984)). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
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benefits of the regulation, the market participant exception 
cannot save the regulation from being struck down as 
constitutionally invalid.48 
C. Overview of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, representatives of the in-
state and out-of-state corn ethanol industry, and American Fuels, 
representatives of petrochemical refineries and manufacturers, 
separately sued the CARB and eventually joined their claims.49  
The parties alleged the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.50  
Additionally, the parties alleged the RFS, as well as the Energy 
Independence and Securities Act, preempted the LCFS.51  The 
main argument was that the regulation facially discriminated 
against fuel producers based on origin, therefore 
unconstitutionally discriminating against out-of-state fuel 
producers in favor of in-state fuel producers.52 
When the case was first consolidated, the head of the CARB 
was James Goldstene.  He was eventually succeeded by Richard 
Corey, causing a change in the case name as it navigated the 
court system.53  At the district court level in Rocky Mtn. Farmers 
Union v. Goldstene (hereinafter “Rocky Mtn. v. Goldstene”), 
economic balkanization or isolation of the market was a major 
concern.54  The district court thought the LCFS isolated the 
 
 48. Id. at 345-46. 
 49. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 
1046-47 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Order on Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion) 
(“Plaintiffs initiated separate actions to challenge California’s LCFS.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 
F.3d 1070,1077 (9th Cir. 2013); Barr et al., supra note 6, § 85.03(4). 
 52. Corey, 730 F.3d.at 1077-78. 
 53. See News Release, ARB Announces Appointment of New Executive Officer, 
CALIFORNIA EPA, AIR RESOURCE BOARD (April 5, 2013), http://www.arb.ca. 
gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php?id=424. 
 54. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1101; Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. See also H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 554 (1949) (“ [F]ear that judicial 
toleration of any state regulations of local phases of commerce will bring about 
what they call ‘Balkanization’ of trade in the United States—trade barriers so 
high between the states that the stream of interstate commerce cannot flow over 
them.”). 
9
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California fuel market from the rest of the nation, and the 
regulation facially discriminated based on origin of the fuel.55  
Therefore, the court granted a preliminary injunction and a 
partial motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
finding the regulation, “violated the dormant commerce clause by 
(1) engaging in extraterritorial regulation, (2) facially 
discriminating against out-of-state ethanol, and (3) 
discriminating against out-of-state crude oil in purpose and 
effect.”56 
The district court did not reach the Pike balancing test and 
stopped at the analysis of the parties’ dormant Commerce Clause 
and preemption arguments under the required standards 
established through dormant Commerce Clause and preemption 
jurisprudence.57  The district court found that the LCFS is not 
expressly preempted by § 211(c)(4), and the LCFS and § 211(o) do 
not conflict with each other.58  However, it did find the LCFS is 
still subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny despite CARB’s 
assertion it was not.59  The district court further determined that 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union and the ethanol industry 
plaintiffs actually did not have standing to bring a preemption 
claim against CARB.60  The court of appeals did not directly 
address the preemption issue as the district court did, but agreed 
with the district court that the LCFS is not a preempted state 
action and did not accept CARB’s argument that California is 
exempt from Commerce Clause challenges.61 
The court of appeals ultimately remanded the case to the 
district court after determining the LCFS was not facially 
discriminatory and was not preempted by federal legislation.  The 
remand required the district court to again evaluate whether the 
regulation discriminates in purpose or effect and if not, to apply 
 
 55. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. 
 56. Id. at 1105; Barr et al., supra note 6, § 85.03(4). 
 57. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1100-07; 5A-35 BARRY S. SHANOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 35.11(2)(c) (2014). 
 58. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. 
 59. Id. at 1047. 
 60. Id. at 1098-99. 
 61. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106; Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
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the Pike balancing test.62  The appellate court in Rocky Mtn. v. 
Corey describes the process to get to the Pike test as follows: 
If a statute discriminates against out-of-state entities on its face, 
in its purpose, or in its practical effect, it is unconstitutional 
unless it ‘serves a legitimate local purpose, and this purpose 
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.’63 
The Pike test requires the court to balance the burdens on 
interstate commerce against the benefits of the regulation for the 
state enacting the regulation.64  On remand, the district court 
will analyze whether the LCFS discriminates in purpose or effect; 
if the LCFS does discriminate in purpose or effect, the court must 
determine whether it places an undue burden on interstate 
commerce under Pike v. Bruce Church.65  The Pike standard 
requires the plaintiff to show “that the Fuel Standard imposes a 
burden on interstate commerce that is ‘clearly excessive’ in 
relation to its local benefits.”66  The court must consider whether 
there are different burdens imposed on in-state and out-of-state 
fuel producers; and if the burdens are different, the court must 
weigh the burdens placed on the out-of-state fuel producers 
against the benefits of the LCFS.67  The nature of the burden 
must be considered and whether the goals of the government 
regulation could be accomplished using less restrictive or less 
burdensome means.68  As described above, the court of appeals 
agreed with the district court’s determination of the preemption 
issue, so this issue will not be re-addressed on remand.69 
The court of appeals notes in its decision for remand that “a 
regulation is not facially discriminatory simply because it affects 
 
 62. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1078; see also Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 2014) (“And we instructed the district court to 
apply strict scrutiny to those provisions if it found that they did discriminate, or 
to apply the balancing test set forth in [Pike] if it found that they did not.”). 
 63. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1087. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
 64. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; Corey, 730 F.3d at 1078. 
 67. SHANOFF, supra note 57, § 35.11(2)(b). 
 68. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 69. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106. 
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in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”70  However, usually 
when a regulation is found to be facially discriminatory, it is 
struck down as unconstitutional because it is difficult to overcome 
the burden of strict scrutiny.71  The court of appeals determined 
the LCFS bases the treatment of different fuels on carbon 
intensity, not on origin.72  Fuel producers in the Midwest or in 
Brazil can and do use methods that create a less carbon-intensive 
fuel than some of the fuels produced within the state of 
California, and the calculation factors to determine fuel intensity 
apply indiscriminately across all producers.73 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also determined the 
LCFS does not discriminate in effect because it does not violate 
extraterritoriality.74  The LCFS does not regulate commerce 
outside California state lines because it does not require other 
states to adopt particular standards or impose civil or criminal 
penalties for any transaction not in compliance with the LCFS 
outside the state.75  The LCFS regulates fuel that is only 
consumed in California.76  The regulation functions as a market 
based incentive for fuel producers to enter the California market 
at competitive prices by distributing less carbon intensive fuel.77  
Because of the location-neutral characteristics of the LCFS, the 
court of appeals determined the regulation does not discriminate 
against out-of-state fuel producers, therefore strict scrutiny did 
not need to be applied.78 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stressed the importance 
of reducing harmful emissions that contribute to climate change 
 
 70. Id at 1089. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). 
 71. Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-08 (1994). 
 72. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1090. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1102-03. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1078 (“We hold that the Fuel Standard's regulation of ethanol does 
not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, and its initial crude-oil 
provisions (the ‘2011 Provisions’) did not discriminate against out-of-state crude 
oil in purpose or practical effect. Further, the Fuel Standard does not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on extraterritorial regulation.”). 
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for the state of California.79  For example, many of the state’s 
inhabitants live in cities near the coastline and are threatened by 
sea level rise.80  Areas of desert in the state would expand 
because of climate change leading to water shortages and 
migrations.81  Reducing emissions falls within the police power of 
the state, because reductions help to mitigate the effects of 
climate change including economic strain associated with 
adaptation measures and serious public health and welfare 
consequences.82 
Arguably, these benefits would be shared in the national and 
international communities, as a reduction in the amount of 
carbon in the planet’s atmosphere would reduce the overall 
severity of global climate change.83  Since transportation 
emissions constitute such a large part of harmful greenhouse gas 
emissions from the state, California has clear interests in taking 
measures to curb climate change through emissions reductions 
regulatory tools like the LCFS.84 
D.   Analysis of Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause           
Jurisprudence 
After denial of the request for an en banc hearing from the 
court of appeals, a successful petition for certiorari from the 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union to the Supreme Court would 
have side stepped the district court’s reanalysis of the case.85  
 
 79. Id. at 1106. 
 80. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106. 
 81. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a), (b) (West 2014); Corey, 730 
F.3d at 1079, 1106; see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on 
Sea Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L. 
REV. 521, 522 (2010). 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
 83. Craig, supra note 81, at 522-23. 
 84. See generally Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079. 
 85. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir.) 
(denial of motion for rehearing en banc and inference that the parties will most 
likely file for certiorari), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Carolyn Whetzel, 
Ethanol Groups Seek Supreme Court Review of California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.bna.com/ethanol-
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari so the case 
will go back to the district court for reanalysis in accordance with 
the reasoning of the court of appeals.86  In the future, however, 
the Supreme Court could grant certiorari to the case as it travels 
through the Ninth Circuit again, as well as a similar case because 
of how important the issues are to the future of state greenhouse 
gas regulation.  As more states adopt regulations, laws, and 
programs aimed at mitigating climate change, courts will have to 
determine whether such actions violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  The Supreme Court jurisprudence described below 
involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state actions 
is helpful in determining how the court might view an issue 
similar to Rocky Mtn. v. Corey.  Analyzing such cases is also 
helpful for states to adequately draft regulations and climate 
change initiatives in order to avoid such constitutional 
challenges. 
The ninth circuit in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey relied on the 
Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause analysis of several 
cases.87  One area of Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence that can be readily compared to Rocky Mtn. v. 
Corey includes cases regarding environmentally based state 
regulations aimed at controlling solid and hazardous waste 
disposal.88  The purpose behind such regulation was to protect 
the citizens of a particular state from harmful health and 
economic effects associated with waste disposal.89  Similarly, the 
goal behind measures such as the LCFS, RGGI, and a state’s RPS 
program is to protect state inhabitants from the harmful health 
and economic effects of climate change.90  To see how the 
Supreme Court may treat a state climate initiative if challenged, 
this comment will discuss four cases included in the Rocky Mtn. 
opinion, two of which are waste cases: Oregon Waste Systems v. 
Department of Environmental Quality, Chemical Waste v. Hunt, 
 
groups-seek-n17179888987/ (discussing that a petition for certiorari was filed on 
March 20, 2014). 
 86. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
 87. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1087. 
 88. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1089. 
 89. Id. 
 90. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7.24 (2009); 9 PHILIP WEINBERG ET 
AL. N.Y. PRAC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 5:57 (2013). 
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Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, and Pharmaceutical Research 
& Manufacturers of America v. Walsh.91 
In Oregon Waste the Supreme Court examined whether an 
Oregon statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
charged a higher surcharge on out-of-state waste to be put in a 
state landfill than in-state waste.92  The Court found the 
surcharge to be facially discriminatory; therefore, the state had to 
show there was a legitimate local purpose that could not be 
accomplished in a non-discriminatory way.93  The regulation 
failed this test because the tax on waste was not sufficiently 
similar, meaning the tax did not apply to in-state and out-of-state 
waste disposers equally.94 
In Chemical Waste v. Hunt, the court found a hazardous 
waste disposal fee imposed on out-of-state waste and not in-state 
waste violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
regulated activity outside the state of Alabama and the only basis 
for the fee was origin rather than a consideration of the harmful 
risks of the waste.95 
The court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey distinguished the two 
regulations discussed in two abovementioned Supreme Court 
cases from the LCFS, and relied on assertions from Oregon Waste 
and Chemical Waste that implied if the out-of-state waste had 
imposed a greater risk of harm than the waste generated within 
the state, a disproportionate tax could have been justified.96  In 
distinguishing the waste cases, the court stressed how the LCFS 
is different because it is not facially discriminatory as it does not 
base the assessment of a fuel on origin, but on carbon intensity of 
the fuel pathway.97  The difference in carbon intensity values 
 
 91. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 
649 (2003); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 
(1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-44 (1992). 
 92. Or. Waste Sys. Inc., 511 U.S. at 96. 
 93. Id. at 108. 
 94. Id. at 100, 101, 105. 
 95. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 342-44. 
 96. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2011). See Or. Waste Sys. Inc., 511 U.S. at 101; Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 
344. 
 97. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1093. 
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reflects the costs imposed on the state of California from climate 
change.98 
Continuing the discussion of Supreme Court dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery, the Court found a regulation banning milk sold in 
plastic, non-recyclable bottles was valid under the Equal 
Protection Clause and Commerce Clause because it had minimal 
impact on interstate commerce, and the state interest in 
protecting the environment was very high.99  The court found the 
regulation was not facially discriminatory because it was a 
general ban that applied to both in-state and out-of-state milk 
producers.100  The court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey relied on 
Minnesota when assessing the facial discrimination of the LCFS 
distinction between HCICO and non-HCICO fuels, and the 
assigned carbon intensity levels.101  The court relied on the 
assertion in Minnesota that a court should assume a legislative 
body’s reasoning for the purpose of a piece of legislation is what 
the legislative body has said it is in the statute, as well as the 
general idea that a state’s environmental concern is a legitimate 
one.102 
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America103 is a 
case involving the state of Maine and pharmaceutical companies 
wishing to sell their drugs within the state.  The regulation in 
question required drug companies that wanted to sell medicine to 
Medicaid recipients within Maine to opt into a rebate program, 
which would result in lower drug costs for consumers.104  If the 
company refused to opt into the program, “prior authorization” of 
any medication the company wanted to sell within the state 
would be required.105  This placed an additional burden on out-of-
state pharmaceutical companies.  The court ultimately upheld the 
regulation as constitutional and not in violation of the dormant 
 
 98. Id. at 1089. 
 99. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981). 
 100. Id. at 471. 
 101. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1097-99. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
 104. See Pharm. Research  & Mfrs. Of Am., 538 U.S. at 644. 
 105. Id. at 649-50. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
12_BARON FINAL_EDITED_NUM_USE 10/1/2015  10:45 AM 
580 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
Commerce Clause, because in requiring manufacturers to meet 
certain economic standards in order to sell medications within 
Maine, the regulation did not regulate the price of medication 
outside the state boundaries.106  In addition, in-state 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are subjected to the same rebate 
requirements as out-of-state manufacturers, and in-state 
manufacturers receive no benefits from the program that would 
place an undue burden on interstate commerce.107  The Circuit 
Court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey analogized the Maine case and 
concluded that California, much like Maine, did not try to control 
the price of fuel outside the state boundaries or control fuel 
manufacturers, but only sought to alter their behavior.108  If 
producers wished to enter the pharmaceutical market in Maine, 
or the transportation fuel market in California, the producer has 
to meet a certain standard, which is a permissible level of 
influence over products to be marketed to consumers within a 
state.109 
III. USING BEST PRACTICES TO AVOID 
CONSTITUTIONAL DRAMA 
President Obama announced his Climate Action Plan on 
June 25, 2013.110  The President’s Plan consists of promises to 
work with Congress on developing market-based greenhouse gas 
initiatives and sets certain national reduction goals.111  The 
President’s Plan directs the EPA to create rules that regulate any 
newly built electric generating units and also directs the EPA to 
develop rules to reduce emissions from existing power plants.112  
In addition, increasing electricity generation from renewable 
sources is an important part of the President’s Plan to meet 
reduction goals.113 
 
 106. Id. at 669. 
 107. Id. at 670. 
 108. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1103. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am., 
538 U.S. at 679. 
 109. See generally Corey, 730 F.3d 1103. 
 110. President’s Climate Action Plan, supra note 2; LEGGETT, supra note 2. 
 111. LEGGETT, supra note 2, at 1. 
 112. Id. at 3. 
 113. Id. at 4. 
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In accordance with the President’s directive, the EPA created 
emissions standards for newly built electricity generating plants 
under section 111(b) and existing electricity generators under 
section 111(d) of the CAA.114  The Supreme Court has recognized 
the importance of the EPA regulating carbon emissions under the 
agency’s section 111 power.115  The EPA recently proposed 
regulations for existing power plants that would not impact 
currently enacted state-based climate initiatives.116 
Section 111(d) of the CAA provides for the cooperation of 
states and the EPA to reduce carbon emissions from the power 
sector.117  In June 2014, EPA issued a proposed rule describing 
the standards a state must meet in order to be in compliance with 
the CAA.118  States have the freedom to design an emissions 
reduction plan employing whatever methods the state chooses in 
order to meet the EPA standards imposed under section 
 
 114. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012); see generally Carbon 
Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Alice Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants: The Co-
Pollutant Implications of EPA’s Clean Air Act § 111(d) Options for Greenhouse 
Gases, 32 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 173, 179-80 (2014). 
 115. American Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538-39 (2011) 
(recognizing the Clean Air Act gives the EPA power to create rules regulating 
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants displacing a federal 
common law nuisance or tort claim for abatement); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding carbon dioxide falls within the definition of “air 
pollutant” under the CAA and authorizes the EPA to regulate such emissions); 
see also Dan Lashof, Clean Air Act is Key to Curbing Global Warming EPA Must 
Cut Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, 33 No. 16 WESTLAW J, ENVTL 
1, Feb. 2013, at *3, available at 2013 WL 704737. 
 116. Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,960; 
Memorandum from the Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democratic Staff to 
the Subcomm. on Energy and Power Democratic Members and Staff 5, 6 (June 
17, 2014), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/Memo-EP-EPA-Carbon-Dioxide-Power-Plant-Regulations-2014-
6-17.pdf. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
 118. Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,960 (A final rule 
must be promulgated by June 2015); see President’s Climate Action Plan, supra 
note 2. 
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111(d).119  The freedom for states to create their own program is 
unlike the Acid Rain program codified in sections 412 and 821 of 
the CAA, which required states to participate in a national cap-
and-trade system for SO2.120  States are able to reduce carbon 
emissions to the applicable standards set by the EPA in multiple 
ways, also known as the “toolbox” approach.121  Some examples 
include renewable portfolio standards, programs similar to RGGI, 
market incentives to increase the use of renewable energy at the 
consumer or producer level, or the state itself investing funds into 
emissions reduction measures.122 
As of right now the EPA has not established a national cap-
and-trade program for greenhouse gases under the agency’s § 
111(d) power.123  In the absence of a national program, states 
must act through their own regulatory machinery.  Although 
states can do what they want in terms of how to achieve carbon 
emissions reductions, such action is still subject to the dormant 
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause.  There are three main 
topics to consider when drafting and implementing state based 
climate initiatives: language, structure and effect, and intent or 
reasoning behind the state action.  When enacting initiatives to 
comply with the EPA’s final rule for existing power plants, states 
must take into account the potential for dormant Commerce 
 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1); see Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 34,960. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q); 40 C.F.R. § 75.1 (2014); see also Acid Rain 
Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/ (last updated July 
25, 2012). 
 121. EPA, CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE CARBON 
POLLUTION FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2013), available at http://www2.epa. 
gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130923statequestions.pdf. 
 122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (2013) (establishing Connecticut’s 
RPS program); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2012) (establishing 
Massachusetts’s RPS program); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 242-1.1 
(2008) (establishing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New York State); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 469A.050 § 36 (West 2007) (establishing Oregon’s RPS 
program); Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, In the Matter 
of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2004), 
available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New York State’s 
RPS). 
 123. See generally Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,960 
(proposed rule for creating standards). 
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Clause challenges to the regulations or initiatives the state plans 
to use to achieve the applicable emissions standard. 
Based on the reasoning of Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence discussed above, a court will 
consider the following topics when deciding a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to state climate initiatives.  First, language of 
the state initiative is clearly important, as courts interpret the 
exact meaning of the language to determine whether it facially 
discriminates against out-of-state industry based on origin in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.124  The Supreme 
Court begins with a facial analysis of a regulation in the cases 
discussed above.125  For example, in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, the 
court of appeals determined that the LCFS does not include 
language that discriminates based on origin, and that the 
lifecycle analysis is applied indiscriminately.126 
Second, the effect of the state action is particularly important 
in dormant Commerce Clause challenges.  State climate 
initiatives cannot ban or restrict market entry from outside the 
regulating state.127  In Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined the LCFS does not place any 
impermissible restrictions on an ethanol producer from entering 
the California market.128 
Finally, a court will focus on the intent or reasons behind the 
state action in a particular area.  For example, courts consider 
whether the action was taken to promote the state’s economy in 
some way or only to prevent the occurrence of detrimental 
 
 124. Rocky Mountain. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089-90 (9th 
Cir. 2013). See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 
2096, 2102 (2013) (Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act expressly 
preempts certain state action). 
 125. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 
661 (2003); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or. 511 U.S. 93 
(1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992). 
 126. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1089. 
 127. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. at 649; Corey, 730 
F.3d at 1102-03. States may not “attach restrictions” to market entry for out-of-
state market participants, however the LCFS does not require another state to 
adopt any standards or control manufacturing in another state. Id. The LCFS 
also does not require any permits or requirements to be met before an out-of-
state producer can enter the California market. Id. 
 128. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1102-03. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
12_BARON FINAL_EDITED_NUM_USE 10/1/2015  10:45 AM 
584 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
environmental or safety effects from a particular industry.129  
Courts also focus on the state’s broad powers of protection for 
their citizens.130 
 
IV. DEFENDING AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO STATE BASED CLIMATE 
CHANGE INITIATIVES ANALYZING NEW 
YORK STATE AS A CASE STUDY 
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey stressed the importance of states being 
able to develop their own climate initiatives to reduce greenhouse 
gas.131  Part IV focuses on state climate initiatives within New 
York State and what states should consider when drafting or 
changing state climate initiatives to avoid constitutional 
challenges.  Part IV.a discusses the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (“RGGI”).  Part IV.b gives an overview of New York 
State’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (“NYS RPS”).  Finally, Part 
IV.c provides an overview of how the implementation of New 
York State’s RGGI regulations and the NYS RPS may be 
considered by other states in creating climate initiatives to 
creatively avoid a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 
A. Overview of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is an agreement 
entered into by nine states in 2005, creating a market-based 
regulatory program focused on reducing emissions from the 
power sector.132  The program is a state-by-state authorized cap-
 
 129. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 1356-57 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“We have long acknowledged a distinction between economic 
protectionism and health and safety regulation promulgated by Oregon.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1980). 
 131. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107. 
 132. Exec. Order No. 24, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 7.24 (2009);  
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 242-1.1 (2008) (establishing the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New York State); Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative  
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf 
[hereinafter RGGI MOU]; REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), 
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and-trade system that requires regulated electrical power 
producers to have a tradable CO2 allowance equivalent to the 
producer’s CO2 emissions, which are initially sold at auction.133  
In addition, allowances can be sold outside of the auction and 
anyone can acquire an allowance, not only the regulated electrical 
utilities.134  Allowances act as a form of currency and have a 
consistent value across state lines: one ton of carbon is equivalent 
to one allowance.135  Proceeds from the quarterly auction can be 
used to promote energy efficiency initiatives and renewable 
energy research and development.136  States in RGGI agree to cap 
emissions at a certain level and reduce emissions by ten percent 
by the year 2019.137  The original agreed upon emissions budget 
was apportioned among participating states, but the determined 
cap has since been modified.138  The modification occurred after 
the price of allowances fell between 2009 and 2012 due to a 
surplus of allowances available despite the decrease in emissions; 
this occurred because of the economic downturn of 2008.139  In 
February of 2013, RGGI participants announced the cap for 2014 
would be reset from 165 million tons to 91 million tons and the 
cap will reduce by 2.5% annually until 2020.140 
The goal of states involved in the RGGI program is to 
encourage lower carbon intensive electricity production over high 
carbon intensive electricity production because of the reduced 
 
http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (An initiative of the Northeast 
and Mid-Atlantic States of the U.S.). 
 133. Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions 
Auctions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 62 (2013). 
 134. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(4) (2014). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Huber, supra note 133, at 78, 86. 
 137. CHARLES HOLT ET AL., AUCTION DESIGN FOR SELLING CO2 EMISSION 
ALLOWANCES UNDER THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_auction_final.pdf. 
 138. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(4). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.; REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, SUMMARY OF RGGI MODEL 
CHANGES 1 (2013), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview 
/_FinalProgramReviewMaterials/Model_Rule_Summary.pdf (describing that the 
Regional Emissions Cap in 2014 will be equal to 91 million tons and that the 
Model Rule language maintains the original 2.5% per year reduction to the 
regional RGGI cap for the years 2015 through 2020). 
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emissions.141 For example, wind produces fewer carbon emissions 
than a traditional coal fired power plant.142  RGGI is considered a 
major success, and the model has been discussed as a part of the 
program framework in a nationwide emissions trading program 
within the energy sector.143  Although RGGI has thus far avoided 
litigation involving a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, 
electricity flows in the interstate market create the potential for 
litigation involving the dormant Commerce Clause.144  RGGI 
adds a new layer of complexity to a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge because it is not a single state enacting regulations or 
standards, but a regional program involving several states.145 
One concern with the initial proposal of the RGGI program 
regarded the concept of leakage, and how a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge could be brought if a participating RGGI state 
tries to protect against the leakage phenomenon.146  Leakage 
occurs after in-state electricity producers incur additional 
expenses to comply with the cap set by their state, which impacts 
prices, leading to cheaper, more carbon-intensive electricity being 
imported from non-regulated sources.147  When the memorandum 
of understanding was entered into, the participating states 
assumed a national cap-and-trade system would be established in 
 
 141. See RGGI Benefits, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.rggi.org/rggi_benefits (last visited Aug. 22, 2014). 
 142. NICHOLAS BIANCO ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., CAN THE U.S. GET THERE FROM 
HERE: USING EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS AND STATE ACTION TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS 9, 11 (2013), available at http://pdf.wri.org/can_us_get_ 
there_from_here_full_report.pdf. 
 143. Huber, supra note 133, at 62, 64. 
 144. See generally 1 STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 6:7.30 
(2014). RGGI has been involved in litigation. See, e.g., Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 
N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (App. Div. 2013) (“Plaintiffs further asserted that the RGGI 
program imposes an unlawful tax upon ratepayers not authorized by the 
Legislature, and that the RGGI program, as implemented, is arbitrary and 
capricious.”); In re Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2014 WL 1228509 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (Environmental groups argued N.J. DEC improperly 
failed to repeal the rules implementing RGGI in the state after N.J. withdrew 
from the program). 
 145. RGGI MOU, supra note 132. 
 146. Lawrence Fogul, Serving a “Public Function”: Why Regional Cap-and-
Trade Programs Should Survive a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (2010). 
 147. Id. at 1326. 
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the near future, which would eliminate the leakage problem if all 
states were subject to a uniform national program.148  
Unfortunately, since the RGGI program was established, a 
national cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases is still not 
in place. 
For a RGGI state like New York, leakage is a real threat 
because of the coal industry in neighboring states like 
Pennsylvania and Ohio.149  RGGI states could curb leakage 
problems by implementing requirements on out-of-state energy 
producers set up similarly to the LCFS.  For instance, a fuel 
pathway system calculating the carbon intensity of different 
electricity production processes applied in the same way to in-
state and out-of-state electricity producers could be used in 
conjunction with the auction program.  The initial pathway 
evaluation could create a surcharge for more carbon intensive 
producers.  It seems the auction model is dealing with the leakage 
problem by promoting energy efficiency, thus decreasing the 
overall demand of electricity, and therefore, decreasing the 
likelihood cheaper unregulated carbon intensive electricity would 
be outsourced.150  The potential for leakage is being studied, but 
RGGI states have to predict any leakage problems that could 
occur and determine what program to implement to prevent 
leakage from occurring.151  Adoption of protectionist provisions in 
a state such as New York to prevent against leakage could lead to 
a better basis for a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.152 
Besides leakage concerns, a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge to RGGI could be based on the control of commerce 
 
 148. William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-
Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in 
Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 363-64 (2009). 
 149. See Huber, supra note 133, at 86. 
 150. Id. at 86-87. 
 151. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE 
AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI) 8-9 (2008) 
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT] available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ 
20080331leakage.pdf. 
 152. ASSEMB. 08872, at 1 (N.Y. 2014), available at http://assembly.state. 
ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08872&term=2013&Summary=Y&Text=Y 
(recently proposed bill recognizing how some out-of-state power generators may 
have economic advantages over New York state power producers because of 
having to purchase RGGI allowances). 
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outside of the boundaries of participating states, also known as 
extraterritorial regulation.153  Healy v. Beer Inst. established that 
the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry should be “whether the 
practical effect of the regulation was to control conduct beyond 
the boundary of the state.”154  The price of electricity for out-of-
state consumers could increase if the consumers purchase 
electricity from regulated facilities under RGGI because 
regulated facilities have to participate in the auction to purchase 
emissions allowances.155  Consumers are protected from drastic 
rate hikes by state public utility commissions; however, a 
company could still increase rates or pass costs onto consumers.  
For example, after approval of such a surcharge by the Public 
Service Commission (“PSC”) an emitter could pass costs through 
an additional charge on an electricity bill deposited in a fund 
directed toward energy efficiency or storm hardening current 
infrastructure.  Although a rate increase would affect in-state and 
out-of-state consumers, consumers living in a participating RGGI 
state, like New York, would receive the benefits of the money 
collected through the auction process because their electricity 
system would be receiving the energy efficiency benefits and 
benefits of offsetting projects conducted by utilities.  A RGGI 
state can even create a consumer benefit program such as one 
that benefits low income consumers with energy efficiency 
retrofitting in their residence.156  Out-of-state consumers would 
receive no such benefit, but instead feel the brunt of any price 
increases on their electricity bill.  Arguably this is a form of 
controlling commerce outside the state boundaries, which would 
be in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
 153. See generally Eric Maher, Note, Weathering Rising Seas in a Sinking 
Ship: The Constitutional Vulnerabilities of The Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 162, 177-79  (2012). 
 154. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)). 
 155. Huber, supra note 133, at 78-79. 
 156. FINAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 51; Maher, supra note 153, at 185. 
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B. Overview of New York State’s Renewable Portfolio 
Standard 
Many states have developed Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
or RPSs, in order to promote development and expansion of 
renewable energy resources within their state.157  An RPS is “[a] 
statutory or regulatory requirement that a load-serving entity 
provide a certain portion of the electricity it supplies to its 
customers from renewable energy sources, or any other statutory 
or regulatory requirement that a certain portion of electricity 
supplied to the electricity grid be generated from renewable 
energy sources.”158  The renewable energy can be generated 
within the state or procured from out-of-state renewable energy 
producers.159  In the original order from the PSC, establishing the 
NYS RPS, at least twenty-five percent of the state’s electricity 
had to come from renewable sources by the year 2013.160  
Renewable technologies that fall within the state’s RPS include, 
“biogas, biomass, liquid biofuel, fuel cells, hydroelectric, 
photovoltaics, ocean or tidal power, and wind.”161  The PSC 
expanded the 25% requirement to 30% in January of 2010, and 
the target year for this increase was changed from 2013 to 2015 
based on the progress the state was making in increasing the use 
 
 157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (2013) (establishing Connecticut’s 
RPS program); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2012) (establishing 
Massachusetts’s RPS program); OR. REV. STAT § 36.469A (2007) (establishing 
Oregon’s RPS program); Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
In the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. 
P.S.C. 2004), available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New 
York State’s RPS). 
 158. NY. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 242-10.2(af) (2008) (definition of 
Renewable Portfolio Standard). 
 159. Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their 
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
259, 261-62 (2008). 
 160. Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard at 3, In the Matter 
of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2004), 
available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New York State’s 
RPS); see also WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 90. 
 161. WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 90, at 1. 
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of renewable energy.162  Funding for the RPS is obtained when 
investor-owned utilities charge a surcharge on customer’s 
electricity bills.163  The RPS uses a “central procurement model” 
where the surcharge funds collected are given to the New York 
State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), 
which implements the programs to meet the RPS reduction 
goals.164  There are two tiers within the RPS, the Main Tier and 
the Customer-Sited Tier.165  The Main Tier is established to fund 
medium to large-scale renewable energy generation projects that 
deliver electricity to the wholesale market.166  The Customer-
Sited Tier is meant to target smaller scale projects such as 
individual photovoltaic systems on a customer’s home.167 
The RPS was enacted in order to promote in-state energy 
production and decrease the amount of out-of-state energy 
production New York State relied upon.168  In 2013, NYSERDA 
petitioned the Commission to adopt a new order after recognizing 
that the economic and environmental benefits of the RPS should 
be intrastate rather than interstate.169  NYSERDA asked the 
Commission to only grant Main Tier renewable energy projects to 
meet the RPS program goals to projects located within the state 
of New York.170  This creates a more difficult hurdle for out-of-
 
 162. See 03-E-0188: Renewable Portfolio Standard – Home Page, N.Y. PUB. 
SERV. COMM’N., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/1008ED2F934294AE 
85257687006F38BD?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 163; NYSERDA, NEW YORK 
STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD: ANNUAL REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER 
31, 2013 1 (2014), available at http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/ 
All/1008ED2F934294AE85257687006F38BD?OpenDocument#psc. 
 165. NYSERDA, supra note 164, at 4. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 4. 
 168. Id. at 3. 
 169. Id. at 2; see also Petition for Modification of Main Tier Program at 1, In 
the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. 
P.S.C. 2012), available at http://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2014/ 
03/nyserda-2012-petition.pdf. 
 170. NYSERDA, supra note 164, at 2; see also Petition for Modification of 
Main Tier Program at 1, In the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio 
Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2012), available at 
http://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/nyserda-2012-petition.pdf. 
See generally Order Authorizing Customer-Sited Tier Program Through 2015 
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state renewable energy producers who want to provide energy to 
the New York State market from receiving funding through the 
RPS for a project or from receiving production incentives.171 
The NYS RPS has main policy objectives that are related to 
supporting the economy of New York State.172  The main 
objectives include creating jobs, reducing energy costs for 
consumers, and promoting investment in-state based projects.173  
Although the program has many positive environmental effects 
because it reduces harmful greenhouse gas emissions, the 
environmental effects are not the focus of the initiative.  As 
previously stated, the NYS RPS collects funds through the 
ratepayers, and those funds then go toward state based programs 
and incentives to increase renewable energy use and 
production.174 
C. Defending against Commerce Clause Challenges to 
State Based Climate Initiatives 
The decision in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, and NYS emission reduction programs are helpful 
sources of information for states trying to avoid constitutional 
challenges to enacted climate change initiatives that focus on 
emissions in the energy sector.175  Although the decision in Rocky 
 
and Resolving Geographic Balance and Other Issues Pertaining to the RPS 
Program, In the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-
0188, (N.Y. P.S.C. 2010), available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/ 
public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7BC05CD0D6-8EA5-4CB9-A9FA-
6ADD3AECB739%7D. 
 171. JACKSON MORRIS ET AL., NEW YORK’S RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD: 
WHERE TO FROM HERE? 12-13 (2013), available at http://energy.pace.edu/ 
sites/default/files/publications/RPS%20Report.pdf. 
 172. See generally NYSERDA, supra note 164. 
 173. Id. at 3. 
 174. See generally Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, In 
the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. 
P.S.C. 2004), available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New 
York State’s RPS). 
 175. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 
1612331, at *13 (D. Minn. 2014). Plaintiffs argued the Minnesota’s Next 
Generation Energy Act violated the Constitution and was preempted by the 
Clean Air Act and Federal Power Act and court found it violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Id. 
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Mtn. v. Corey focused on gasoline, diesel fuel, and various forms 
of ethanol produced using renewable feedstock, the LCFS treats 
electricity as a transportation fuel since it can be used to power 
plug-in electric vehicles.176  A producer of an alternative fuel 
under the LCFS, such as electricity, has the option of opting-in 
and submitting to regulation.177  After a party opts in they are 
able to trade LCFS credits and are subject to the requirements of 
the LCFS.178  The regulation requires an electricity fuel provider 
to submit a carbon intensity calculation for the electricity a 
facility is producing under section 95484 if the facility opts in as a 
regulated party.179  Including electricity as a type of regulated 
fuel under the LCFS marks a move forward in recognizing the 
large part electricity plays in climate change. 
Electricity is also taken into account in the lifecycle analysis 
of any fuel under the LCFS.180  California actually applies 
additional regulations to electricity producers beyond the LCFS 
in order to limit emissions.  The previously mentioned Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 regulates the electricity being 
produced and imported into the state through a cap-and-trade 
system that is somewhat similar to RGGI.181 
When evaluating the types of electricity a fuel production 
facility is able to use, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rocky 
Mtn. v. Corey determined although the source of electricity might 
be dependent on geographic location, this does not mean the 
LCFS is discriminating against out-of-state producers because it 
continues to allow the market to function.182  The court notes, “if 
producers of out-of-state ethanol actually cause more GHG 
emissions for each unit produced, because they use dirtier 
electricity or less efficient plants, CARB can base its regulatory 
 
 176. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480.1(a)(5), 95480.5(a)(1), 95484(a)(6) 
(2010). 
 177. Id. § 95480.5(a)(1). 
 178. Tit. 17, § 95480.5(a)(1). 
 179. Id. § 95484(b)(3)(C)(5) (describing that for electricity used as a 
transportation fuel, a regulated party must also submit the following: The 
carbon intensity value of the electricity determined pursuant to section 95486). 
 180. Id. § 95486(a)(2)(E). 
 181. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(5)(g) (2014). 
 182. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
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treatment on these emissions.”183  For example, a facility near 
coal production can use the cheapest most convenient fuel; 
however, the dormant Commerce Clause does not “guarantee that 
ethanol producers may compete on the terms they find most 
convenient.”184 
A court analyzing a state’s climate initiative would begin at 
the same place the court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey began: 
determining whether the measure is facially discriminatory.  
RGGI resists a dormant Commerce Clause claim in a similar way 
as the LCFS.  RGGI does not discriminate facially against out-of-
state electricity producers because such producers can enter the 
auction and purchase allowances if they want.185  RGGI also does 
not discriminate in purpose or effect because the market 
continues to function in a competitive way.  RGGI has an 
additional strong defense against a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge that the LCFS does not, because the program is not 
limited to one state.  RGGI involves a collective of several states 
enacting the provisions of the program in their own ways,186 and 
is considered a major success for cap-and-trade programs because 
of the nature of electricity as a commodity.187  Further, in 
response to the Pike balancing test, a state involved in RGGI or a 
similar program can assert the burdens on interstate commerce 
are not clearly excessive when compared to the benefits the states 
are receiving in avoiding costs due to climate change caused by 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.188 
In addition, any dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
state action for violating extraterritoriality and burdening 
commerce outside of the participating state could be defended by 
adopting the reasoning in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey.  The plaintiffs in 
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey tried to argue that the LCFS was regulating 
commercial activity outside of California.189  The court of appeals 
 
 183. Id. at 1090. 
 184. See generally id. at 1092. 
 185. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(5)(g). 
 186. RGGI MOU, supra note 132, at 2. 
 187. Huber, supra note 133, at 62-64, 93. 
 188. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S 137, 142 (1970). 
 189. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1102-03 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
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determined the regulation was not controlling any market 
activity outside the state of California because it imposed no duty 
on fuel producers to submit to regulation, and did not threaten 
civil or criminal penalties for compliance failure.190  A challenge 
to state initiatives alleging the regulation impermissibly controls 
commerce outside the participating states would be evaluated 
under the Healy standard.191  Healy requires the court to 
evaluate the direct consequences of the regulation and the 
interaction between the regulation and other state’s regulations, 
particularly if multiple states or all of the states adopted the 
same regime.192 
As the LCFS does not require fuel producers outside the state 
to submit to regulation by changing their business in any way, 
RGGI imposes no duty on utilities to raise consumer prices in 
order to participate in the auction or change the way they are 
producing electricity.  A utility may choose to change its 
production processes if it is economically more feasible for them 
to reduce emissions rather than pay for allowances.  Finally, the 
very goal of RGGI is to act as a model for a potential national 
regulatory scheme, and is even somewhat dependent on the 
eventual adoption of a national program.193 If a national program 
is established, it is impossible for the phenomenon of economic 
Balkanization, or separation and isolation of markets, to occur in 
violation of the Constitution. 
The concern of the district court in Rocky Mtn. v. Goldstene 
regarding economic Balkanization is not a real threat in a 
program like RGGI where an electricity grid is already arguably 
divided into regions or states acting as their own market.194  The 
court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey discredited the lower court’s 
Balkanization concern by concluding the LCFS only regulates the 
California market and if each state adopted such a regulation, it 
would not impermissibly interfere with interstate trade or create 
conflicting standards for fuel producers because, “no form of fuel 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. See generally Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 192. Id. at 336. 
 193. FINAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 12-15. 
 194. See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
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would be excluded from or charged an unapportioned fee to enter 
any state’s market, no state would attempt to control which fuels 
were available in other states, and no state would peg its fuel 
prices or regulatory standards to those of another.”195  A program 
like RGGI is similar because electricity producers and those who 
want to trade allowances are not prevented from entering the 
auction market in any way, and participating states are not 
controlling the behavior of electricity producers or limiting the 
access of consumers to a particular type of electricity production 
outside their own boundaries.  If a similar program was enacted 
in every state, each state would be able to participate in a 
nationwide auction where allowances would have equal value 
across state lines, and consumers, who are already limited in 
their choice of electricity provider due to geographical limitations, 
would not be prevented from purchasing electricity from a chosen 
provider. 
Also, RGGI’s auction system eliminates problems associated 
with cap-and-trade.  For example, giving away allowances to 
regulated parties has proven to be ineffective in a cap-and-trade 
program because it can result in a profit windfall for facilities 
because they receive some allowances for free rather than 
purchasing them at market price, while the RGGI auction allows 
the market to set its own price.196  If a program similar to RGGI 
were set up in other regions, or nationally, it would promote the 
free market auction of allowances, as well as the development 
and use of less carbon intensive energy production.  Like the 
LCFS, the program is able to avoid a challenge of economic 
Balkanization, and it clearly passes the Healy standard because 
RGGI is not trying to control commerce outside the boundaries of 
the states involved in the memorandum. 
 
 195. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1105 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 196. Huber, supra note 133, at 62, 74. 
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D. Jobs: The Trojan Horse of State Based Climate 
Initiatives 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges have actually been 
litigated against state RPS programs including New York.197  
New York State’s RPS program could continue to be attacked if 
the Commission allows the program to focus on developing 
renewable energy projects and contracts with renewable energy 
generators within the state in order to provide economic and 
environmental benefits to the people of New York.198  When the 
purpose of a regulation is to benefit in-state producers over out-
of-state producers, it is a per se violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.199 
Out-of-state renewable energy producers can still provide 
renewable energy that counts towards the RPS goal with the 
current structure in place.200  In Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined the LCFS was not regulating 
commercial activity outside of California because it imposed no 
duty on fuel producers to submit to regulation, and did not 
threaten civil or criminal penalties for compliance failure.201  The 
RPS does not require renewable electricity producers outside the 
state to submit to any additional requirements.202  The renewable 
fuel market continues to function within the state, and the power 
 
 197. See e.g., Petition for Rehearing at 1, HQ Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc. v. 
NYSERDA, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2013), available at http://documents. 
dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B513E6095-F3C1-4188-
814E-BD3AF83CE5D6%7D; TransCanada Power Mktg, Ltd.. v. Mass. Dep’t 
Pub. Utils., No. 4:10-CV-40070-FDS (D. Mass. 2010) (Partial Settlement 
Agreement), available at  http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/ 
settlement-agreement.pdf.; Bruce Mohl, Bowles Sued on Renewable Policies, 
COMMONWEALTH (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/News-
and-Features/Online-exclusives/2010/Spring/Bowles-sued-on-renewable-
policies.aspx (describing how the developer of a wind energy project suing the 
state for directing subsidies towards in-state renewable projects through the 
Green Communities Act). 
 198. Endrud, supra note 159, at 270. 
 199. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 200. MORRIS ET AL., supra note 171, at 12. 
 201. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1102-03. 
 202. See Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard at 62-63, In 
the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. 
P.S.C. 2004), available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm. 
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produced by a renewable electricity producer outside the state 
boundaries can still be used to meet RPS goals.203  The NYS RPS 
does not violate the concept of extraterritoriality, and it does not 
have a discriminatory effect on out-of-state renewable electricity 
producers.204 
If a court found the RPS does not facially discriminate, or 
discriminate in purpose or effect, the court would then reach the 
Pike test.205  Like RGGI, the limited range of electricity to travel 
as a commodity in the market makes the product of electricity 
different from traditional transportation fuel regulated under the 
LCFS.206  The burden on interstate commerce is very unlikely to 
be considered “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits,” because of electricity’s limited range caused by the 
physical constraints of the energy transmission system.207  If the 
New York State RPS was challenged under the dormant 
Commerce Clause in its current form, it is unlikely a court would 
find it fails the Pike balancing test. 
The NYS RPS is a model for states to consider when drafting 
their own RPS, particularly based on recent case law.  In North 
Dakota v. Heydinger, a Minnesota district court determined 
Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act impermissibly 
regulated commerce outside the state’s boundaries—a per se 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.208  The regulation 
stated that “no person shall . . . import or commit to import from 
outside the state power from a new large energy facility that 
would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide 
 
 203. Id. (“For commerce to occur, the product, electricity generated from 
renewable resources, must be in the State to be sold to retail customers. The 
RPS promotes interstate commerce by allowing imports on the same terms as 
electricity generated within the State. The delivery requirement applies to 
domestic Case 03-E-0188 generation as well as imports. Therefore, it is 
equivalently applied to in-State and out-of-State renewable generation sources 
and imposes only a minimal, if any, burden on commerce.”). 
 204. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 205. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S 137, 142 (1970). 
 206. Endrud, supra note 159, at 264 n.34. 
 207. Id. at 271-72; see generally John R. Norris and Jeffrey F. Dennis, Electric 
Transmission Infrastructure: A Key Piece of the Energy Puzzle, 25 NATURAL RES. 
& ENV’T 3 (Spring 2011). 
 208. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331, 
at *13 (D. Minn. 2014). 
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emissions; or enter into a new long-term power purchase 
agreement that would increase statewide power sector carbon 
dioxide emissions.”209  This type of overbroad language, and the 
attempt to regulate interstate power contracts, clearly will not 
survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.210 
The NYS RPS has two additional characteristics that limit 
the program’s susceptibility to a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge.  First, as previously discussed, the state’s reasons for 
implementing the RPS are primarily economic, and the economic 
reasons continue to be stressed over the positive environmental 
effects.211  Presenting the program in this way makes it much 
more approachable to a variety of legislators and more accepted 
by the public.  However, climate change and environmental 
benefits should not be overlooked when creating similar 
programs, particularly since states might enact similar programs 
in response to the EPA’s final 111(d) rule on carbon emissions.212  
The second characteristic is the application of the market 
participant exception to the NYS RPS.  The state participates in 
the market by directly collecting the funds from consumers, and 
then NYSERDA determines what projects to fund within the 
state.213  The state is arguably directly participating in the 
market and not regulating in the traditional sense.214  The state 
is merely re-distributing funds collected through resident’s 
electricity bills.  Therefore, NYS RPS likely falls within the 
exception. States creating an RPS program should structure the 
program similarly to the NYS RPS to limit dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges. 
 
 209. MINN. STAT ANN § 216H.03(3) (West 2007); Heydinger, 2014 WL 1612331, 
at *3. 
 210. This type of regulation will also not survive a preemption challenge as 
the regulation of interstate power contracts is left to the federal power of FERC 
under the Federal Power Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012). 
 211. See generally NYSERDA, supra note 164. 
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1) (2012); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified 
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 
Fed. Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 213. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 162; NYSERDA, supra note 164, 
at 1. 
 214. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330, 345-46 (2007); White v. Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 
U.S. 204, 208 (1983). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Developing state and national climate change regulations is 
of the utmost importance and urgency. With the EPA’s final rule 
proposal due in June 2015, states are encouraged to develop 
regulations, laws, or programs to comply with the promulgated 
greenhouse gas emissions standards.215  However, these new 
regulations or state initiatives must fall within the existing 
bounds of constitutionality and legality.  Specifically, the dormant 
Commerce Clause presents a unique threat to comprehensive 
greenhouse gas regulation in the absence of federal legislation. 
Facing this risk, as states follow a “toolbox” approach in 
using various programs to reduce emissions, state regulators 
should also follow a “toolbox” approach in drafting emissions 
regulation.  Best practices for such regulation include clear 
language, non-discriminatory and equal treatment provisions for 
in-state and out-of-state market participants, and express intent 
to regulate carbon for the purpose of mitigating climate change 
and the corresponding economic benefits that can occur from 
mitigation. California’s ongoing experience with the LCFS and 
New York’s success with RGGI and the NYS RPS, demonstrate 
the potential for states to act against climate change with 
measurable success. 
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